These two markets ask the same fundamental question—will the United States and Iran reach a permanent peace deal?—but with critically different timelines that reveal how traders weigh urgency against feasibility. Market B requires the deal by June 30, 2026 (33% YES), while Market A extends the deadline to December 31, 2026 (67% YES). The 34-percentage-point spread between them reflects trader conviction that a deal is possible, but substantially more likely with an extra six months of diplomatic runway. The relationship between these markets is strict containment: any deal resolving YES on Market B automatically resolves YES on Market A. Conversely, a deal signed after July 1, 2026 would resolve NO on Market B but YES on Market A. This gap—from 33% to 67%—can be interpreted as the market's implied probability of a deal landing in the July–December window. If traders believe a deal will happen, the June 30 deadline is the constraint; the December 31 deadline is the safety net. This distinction carries enormous weight for negotiation dynamics: a mid-year resolution requires breakthrough-speed diplomacy, while a year-end resolution permits the conventional grinding pace of international talks on sanctions relief, nuclear terms, and verification frameworks. Outcomes could correlate strongly or diverge meaningfully depending on negotiation momentum. If geopolitical conditions shift positively—breakthrough on sanctions, nuclear agreement structure, or regional de-escalation—both markets could spike together. Conversely, indefinite stall-out would collapse both toward low percentages. However, the divergence scenario is more likely: if talks visibly progress but move slowly, Market A will maintain substantial YES conviction while Market B remains anchored to its unmet June deadline. This split is especially probable if negotiations produce an agreement-in-principle by mid-year but final ratification and implementation stretch into the second half of 2026. Traders should monitor several key signals. First, watch public statements from US and Iranian diplomats—mutual goodwill language lifts both markets, but "momentum by summer" messaging favors Market B while "progress by year-end" strengthens Market A. Second, track sanctions relief announcements and nuclear deal negotiations, which are typically prerequisites to permanent peace. Third, observe external shocks: regional escalations, domestic political shifts, or key diplomatic personnel changes could reverse both markets sharply. Finally, monitor the spread itself; if it widens significantly beyond 34 points, it may signal growing uncertainty about deal mechanics or what "permanent" legally entails—a marker of execution risk pricing, not just timeline risk.